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Abstract—In this paper we introduce the Organization,
Relationship, and Contact Analyzer (ORCA) that is designed
to aide intelligence analysis for law enforcement operations
against violent street gangs. ORCA is designed to address
several police analytical needs concerning street gangs using
new techniques in social network analysis. Specifically, it can
determine “degree of membership” for individuals who do not
admit to membership in a street gang, quickly identify sets of
influential individuals (under the tipping model), and identify
criminal ecosystems by decomposing gangs into sub-groups.
We describe this software and the design decisions considered
in building an intelligence analysis tool created specifically for
countering violent street gangs as well as provide results based
on conducting analysis on real-world police data provided
by a major American metropolitan police department who is
partnering with us and currently deploying this system for
real-world use.
Keywords-complex networks; social networks; criminology
I. INTRODUCTION
Violent street gangs are a major cause of criminal activity
in the United States [1]. In this paper, we present a new
piece of software, Organizational, Relationship, and Contact
Analyzer (ORCA) that is designed from the ground-up to
apply new techniques in social network analysis and mining
to support law enforcement. In particular, we look to enable
improved intelligence analysis on criminal street gangs. The
software combines techniques from logic programming, [2]
viral marketing, [3], [4] and community detection [5], [6]
in a usable application custom-tailored for law enforcement
intelligence support. This work is inspired by recent work
in law enforcement that recognizes similarities between
gang members and insurgents and identifies adaptations
that can be made from current counter-insurgency (COIN)
strategy to counter gang violence. [1], [7] Due to the striking
similarities between gang-violence and COIN, the authors
from the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) responded
to requests from a major metropolitan police department to
transition recent social network mining software. As a result,
several West Point cadets were able to not only conduct
research, but also gain a better understanding of a COIN
environment.
The main contribution of this paper is the ORCA software
which is the first software, to our knowledge, that combine
the aforementioned techniques into a single piece of software
designed for law-enforcement intelligence analysis. The
paper is organized as follows. Section II describes ORCA
and its various components while Section III provides the
results of our preliminary evaluation. Finally, related work
is discussed in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The police department we worked with to develop ORCA
described several issues concerning the intelligence analysis
of street gangs. They desired a software system that could
accomplish the following tasks.
1) Ability to ingest police arrest data and visualize net-
work representations of such data. The police data
in question primarily consists of arrest reports which
include the individual’s personal information as well
as claimed gang membership (if disclosed). This data
also includes relationships among individuals arrested
together.
2) Ability to determine degree of group membership.
While many gang members will disclose their gang
affiliation, some will not - likely fearing legal conse-
quences. Hence, to better allocate police efforts and
intelligence gathering resources, it is important to
assign these unaffiliated members to a gang (with a
degree of confidence).
3) Ability to identify sets of influential members. Though
criminal street gangs are decentralized, it is suspected
that there are groups of individuals that can exert influ-
ence throughout a given gang - encouraging criminal
activity that is more violent and risky than the norm.
Identifying groups of individuals in this position of in-
fluence would provide law enforcement professionals
insight into the ability of these organizations to easily
adopt such behavior.
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Figure 1. Overview of components and functions of ORCA.
4) Ability to map the “ecosystem” of a given gang.
Criminal street gangs tend to be highly modular orga-
nizations, with identifiable sub-groups. In particular,
“corner crews” - groups of individuals in a gang
who conduct illicit drug transactions on the same
street corner - will form highly connected clusters
in a social network representation of a street gang.
Further, understanding the relationships among these
sub-organizations - both within a given gang and
between different gangs provides substantial insight
into inter/intra gang dynamics as well as in identifying
individuals that connect different organizations.
Note that all of the above described functions were
included in ORCA in a direct response to the needs of
the law enforcement professionals that we have met. These
individuals are directly from our target user population to
whom we are transitioning the software to in mid-2013.
ORCA was written in Python 2.7.3 on top of the Net-
workX 1.7 library 1. In Figure 1 we show our overall
scheme for the design of ORCA to address the above
challenges. The key components we leveraged in building
the system included the MANCaLog framework which we
used to determine degree of membership, TIP DECOMP
was leveraged to find sets of influential members, and the
Louvain algorithm which we built on to map the ecosystems
of the various gangs. We describe how we designed each
major part throughout the remainder of this section.
Police data was ingested into the system in the form of
spreadsheet data that was derived from SQL queries from
a police database. For purposes of development and ex-
perimental evaluation, all personally-identifying information
was anonymized. From this data, we utilized the “individual
record” number of each person arrested and created a social
network between two individuals that were arrested together
(co-arrestees). To handle this network data structure, we
utilized the Python library NetworkX mentioned earlier. The
police also required visualizations of these social networks
1http://networkx.github.io/documentation/latest/index.html
(which are shown later). These visualizations were also
included in the context of intelligence reports automatically
generated by the software (which are based on the subse-
quently described components).
A. Determining Degree of Membership
Analytically associating arrested individuals with a crim-
inal gang is an important piece of intelligence to law
enforcement officials. Even though analysis itself is not
direct evidence against an individual, it may be used as a
starting point to gather further information. Individuals who
do not admit to being in a gang may still have associates that
do admit to membership of a certain gang. Hence, we looked
to contribute to the solution to this problem by assigning
such individuals a degree of membership - a real number in
the interval [0, 1] that represents the confidence that the in-
dividuals is in a given gang. A value of 0 may be interpreted
as having no information on the individual’s affiliation with
a given gang while a value of 1 would be interpreted as the
individual as having admitted to being in the gang. To assign
these degree of membership values, we utilize MANCaLog,
a logic-programming based framework [2]. This framework
considers a network represented as a graph G = (V,E)
where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of (undirected)
relationships. For a given i ∈ V , ηi = {j|(i, j) ∈ E} and
di = |ηi|. The vertices can be assigned with a label from the
set L. Each label assigned to a vertex is given a value (in
the interval [0, 1] which associates that label with the vertex
with a degree of confidence. Hence, we use of network
representation of the co-arrestees as the graph and the set
of different gangs are the labels. Individuals who are known
to be in a certain gang are assigned a confidence value of
1 for that gang and 0 for the others. Through MANCaLog,
we can then assign a degree of confidence to the remaining
nodes derived from rules of the following form:
grp1 ←
∨
i
¬〈grpi, 1〉, (grp1)ifl (1)
Intuitively, the above rule says that a node will be assigned
to group 1 if it has not already been assigned to another
group (with a confidence of 1) and has a certain number
of neighbors who are also in group 1. A set of such rules
is referred to as a MANCaLog program and denoted P . A
program may also have facts of the form (〈grpi, x〉, v) which
means that vertex v has a degree of membership in group i
with a confidence of x.
In the above rule, the confidence value assigned to a node
being in group 1 is based on the influence function (ifl )
which maps natural numbers to reals in the interval [0, 1].
For instance, an influence function may look something like
the following:
Algorithm 1 IFL LEARN
Require: Group label g, program P
Ensure:
1: Let R be an array indexed from 1 to d∗ (the maximum degree
of the network).
2: for i = 1, . . . d∗ do
3: Set pos = 0, tot = 0
4: for v ∈ V do
5: Set Xv = {v′|(v′, v) ∈ E ∧ (〈g, 1〉, v′) ∈ P}
6: if |Xv| ≥ i then
7: tot = tot+ 1
8: if (〈g, 1〉, v) ∈ P then
9: pos = pos+ 1
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: If i = 0, R[i] = pos/tot − 1.96 ∗ SER(pos, tot),
else R[i] = max(R[i − 1], pos/(pos + neg) − 1.96 ∗
SER(pos, tot)) where SER is the standard error on the
fraction of positive neighbors.
14: end for
15: return R
ifl(x) =

0.0 if x = 0
0.1 if 1 ≤ x ≤ 3
0.5 if x ≥ 4
(2)
In [2], the authors showed that such confidence values
can be assigned to all vertices in the network for all labels
in polynomial time. However, a key issue is to derive the
influence function for the rules. We devised a simple strategy
for learning the influence function for each label (in this case
group) and have included it as algorithm IFL LEARN.
Algorithm IFL LEARN considers one group label (g) and
finds the fraction of neighbors. We view each node as getting
“signals” from its neighbors who are in that group. For
each potential number of signals (which is between one and
the maximum in-degree of the network) Algorithm 1 below
computes the fraction of nodes with at least that number of
signals who are in the group. It then computes the 95% lower
bound confidence interval based on standard error. This is
used as the lower bound of the degree of membership as
returned by the function. Then, based on an assumption of
monotonicity (based on the results of [8]), the algorithm sets
the lower bound to be the maximum between the previous
lower bound and the current.
The algorithm returns a matrix R, and the resulting
influence function is ifl(x) = R[x]. This algorithm is a
simple approach to learning rules from available data and no
novelty is claimed; more complex and general approaches
to rule learning are outside the scope of this paper and are
the topic of ongoing work.
B. Identifying Seed Sets
According to the law enforcement professionals we met,
the idea of influence is critical to understanding the behavior
of violent street gangs. Of particular concern is the influence
of radicalizing gang members - charismatic individuals that
not only participate in abnormally risky and violent behavior,
but have the ability to encourage others to do the same.
In order to identify sets of individuals who conduct such
behavior, we consider the idea of influence spread through
the “tipping model” [9]. In such a model, we again consider
a population structured as a social network (G = (V,E))
where each vertex i ∈ V is adjacent to di edges. We
model a social contagion that spreads through the network
as follows: consider unaffected node i. If at least ddi/2e of
i’s neighbors have the contagion, then i has the contagion –
otherwise it does not. A key question regarding this model
is to identify a seed set - a set of vertices in the network
that, if initially infected, will lead to the entire population
receiving the contagion. Identifying a seed set provides the
analyst a set of individuals that, when taken together, are
very influential to the overall network. Further, if the seed
set is of minimal size, then the size of the set can be used as a
proxy to measure how easily the network can be influenced.
Unfortunately, a simple reduction from set cover shows that
finding a seed set of minimal size is an NP-hard problem. [3]
However, we have designed a fast heuristic algorithm that
finds seed sets of very small size in practice. [4] This
algorithm is based on the idea of shell decomposition often
cited in physics literature [10], [11], [12], [13] but modified
to ensure that the resulting set will lead to all nodes being
infected. The algorithm, TIP DECOMP is presented in this
section.
Algorithm 2 TIP DECOMP
Require: Threshold function, θ and directed social network
G = (V,E)
Ensure: V ′
1: For each vertex i, disti = bdi/2c.
2: FLAG = TRUE.
3: while FLAG do
4: Let i be the element of V where disti is minimal.
5: if disti =∞ then
6: FLAG = FALSE.
7: else
8: Remove i from G and for each j in ηi, if distj > 0,
set distj = distj − 1. Otherwise set distj =∞.
9: end if
10: end while
11: return All nodes left in G.
Intuitively, the algorithm proceeds as follows (Figure 1).
Given network G = (V,E),at each iteration, pick the node
for which bdi/2c is the least but positive (or 0) and remove
Figure 2. Example of TIP DECOMP for a simple network depicted in
box A. Next to each node label (lower-case letter) is the value for bdi/2c.
In the first four iterations, nodes e, f, h, and i are removed resulting in the
network in box B. This is followed by the removal of node j resulting in
the network in box C. In the next two iterations, nodes a and b are removed
(boxes D-E respectively). Finally, node c is removed (box F). The nodes of
the final network, consisting of d and g, have negative values for bdi/2c
and become the output of the algorithm.
it. Once there are no nodes for which this quantity is positive
(or 0), the algorithm outputs the remaining nodes in the
network.
In addition to providing the seed set for each street
gang, ORCA also provides information about influential
individuals. The shell number for each vertex based on the
process of shell decomposition [10] has been previously
shown to correlate with the vertex’s influence based on the
networked version of various epidemic models. [12]
C. Identifying Ecosystems
Another important capability for ORCA was to decom-
pose street gangs into component organizations. In some
cases, street gangs will not be monolithic organizations, but
rather confederations of various factions - many of which
may be ill identified by authorities. Further, to maintain a
gang’s lines of funding, sub-organizations known as “corner
crews” operate as an informal unit to conduct narcotics sales
within certain parts of a given gang’s territory.
A common method to identify communities in a social
network is to partition it in a way to maximize a quan-
tity known as modularity. [5] We shall use the notation
C = {c1, . . . , cq} to denote a partition over set V where
each ci ∈ C is a subset of V , for any ci, cj ∈ C,
ci ∩ cj = ∅ and
⋃
i ci = V . For a given partition, C, the
modularity M(C) is a number in [−1, 1] . The modularity
of a network partition can be used to measure the quality of
its community structure. Originally introduced by Newman
and Girvan [5], this metric measures the density of edges
within partitions compared to the density of edges between
partitions. A formal definition of this modularity for an
undirected network is defined as follows.
Given partition C = {c1, . . . , cq}, modularity,
M(C) =
1
2m
∑
c∈C
∑
i,j∈c
wij − Pij
where Pij =
kikj
2m .
The modularity of an optimal network partition can be
used to measure the quality of its community structure.
Though modularity-maximization is NP-hard, the approxi-
mation algorithm of Blondel et al. [6] (a.k.a. the “Louvain
algorithm”) has been shown to produce near-optimal parti-
tions.2 The modularity associated with this algorithm is often
called the “Louvain modularity” and the associated partition
is a “Louvain partition.”
ORCA not only finds the Louvain partition, but also
explores the relationships among the sub-groups within and
between gangs. For a given gang, ORCA generates a graph
showing the relationship among all sub-groups in that gang
and the neighboring sub-groups from different gangs. We
call this the “ecosystem” of a given gang. The ecosystem
is of particular importance to law-enforcement officers for
many reasons. One, in particular, is the issue of gang
retaliation. Consider the following: in the aftermath of a
violent incident initiated by group A against group B, police
enforcement will increase patrols in the territory controlled
by group B. As a result, group B will rely on an allied
organization (group C) to conduct retaliatory action against
group A. Identifying the ecosystem of a given gang helps
provide insight into organizations likely to conduct such
activities.
Further, it identifies individuals who have connections to
various other sub-groups. The intuition behind these indi-
viduals is that they connect various organizations together.
We refer to these individuals as “connectors.” Connectors
are also important to law-enforcement personnel as they
are individuals who often connect geographic disparate
sub-groups of a larger gang organization. Another use for
connectors is as a liaison between gangs that cooperate. For
instance, suppose group 1 wants to sell drugs in group 2’s
territory. An agreement is reached between the two groups
that group 1 can conduct these sales provided it pays a tax
to group 2. Hence, a liaison between the two groups may
be a facilitator in such an arrangement.
III. EVALUATION
We evaluated ORCA on a police dataset of 5418 arrests
from a single police district over a three period of time.
There were 11, 421 relationships among the arrests. From
this data, ORCA assembled a social network consisting of
1468 individuals (who were members in one of 18 gangs)
2Louvain modularity was computed using the implementation available
from CRANS at http://perso.crans.org/aynaud/communities/.
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Figure 3. Influence functions for five of the gangs examined by ORCA.
and 1913 relationships. ORCA was able to complete this
assembly in addition to all analysis (determining degree of
membership, finding seed sets, and developing ecosystems)
took 34.3 seconds on a commodity laptop (Windows 8, B960
2.2 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM).
A. Degree of Membership
First, we examined the performance of the system in
identifying degree of membership. As stated earlier, this
was determined using our MANCaLog framework that op-
erated in two steps: learning the influence functions and
then applying the MANCaLog inference engine to compute
degree of membership. Figure 3 shows a plot of the influence
functions derived for five of the gangs. Specifically, it shows
the number of neighboring individuals in the given gang on
the x-axis compared to the computed degree of membership
for an individual having that number of gang contacts on the
y-axis. We note that our degree of membership computation
provides a similar result to [8] which studies the related
problem of social contagion.
In the second step required to determine the degree of
membership, the MANCaLog inference engine created logic
programs that utilized the influence functions to determine
degree of membership for individuals who did not admit
to being in a gang. All of the 180 unadmitted individuals
connected to the derived social network (individuals who
did not admit to being in a gang but were arrested with at
least one other individual in the district) were assigned a
non-zero degree of membership based on learned rules. The
majority of these individuals could be assigned a degree
of membership greater than 0.5 for at least one gang (see
Figure 4). We note that many of these individuals were
assigned a degree of membership to multiple gangs. This
may primarily be due to the fact that the included arrest
reports spanned a three-year time-frame - which our police
counterparts state is a relatively long period of time in
street gang culture. In such a time, gang members often
change allegiances and/or form new gangs. Exploring a
longitudinal study where time is explicitly considered is
an important direction for future work. The MANCaLog
framework allows for temporal reasoning as well.
0
50
100
150
200
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
In
d
vi
d
u
al
s
Degree of Membership
(0.0,0.1) [0.1,0.2) [0.2,0.3) [0.3,0.4)
[0.4,0.5) [0.5,0.6) [0.6,1.0)
Figure 4. Histogram showing the number of individuals assigned a degree
of membership within a certain range.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
G
1
7
5
G
2
5
8
G
3
2
2
G
3
3
6
G
4
2
2
G
4
6
5
G
6
2
6
G
6
7
2
G
9
8
6
G
0
3
4
G
1
9
7
G
2
3
7
G
3
8
3
G
6
5
1
G
8
0
9
G
8
1
4
G
8
1
5
G
8
4
6
Se
ed
 S
et
 S
iz
e
 (
%
 o
f 
To
ta
l)
 
Street Gang
GROUP A GROUP B
Figure 5. Seed size as a percentage of the total gang membership for
the 18 street gangs analyzed by ORCA organized into two different racial
groups.
B. Seed Set Identification
We also examined the seed sets found by ORCA for each
of the street gangs. These are sets of individuals who can
initiate a social cascade (under the majority threshold tipping
model) that will cause universal adoption in the gang. The
size of the seed set as a percentage of the population of each
gang is shown in Figure 5. The street gangs in the police
district we examined were racially segregated - belonging
to one of two races. Police officers working in the district
have told us that gangs of Racial Group A are known for
a more centralized organizational structure while gangs of
Racial Group B have adopted a decentralized model. These
groups are denoted in Figure 4. We were able to quantify
this observation as the gangs in Racial Group A had (on
average) seed sets 3.86% smaller than those in Group B.
C. Finding Communities and Identifying Ecosystems
As stated earlier, law enforcement personnel have much
interest in identifying sub-organizations of a given street
gang. ORCA tackled this problem using the Louvain algo-
rithm as described in the previous section. For the 18 street
gangs examined in this study, ORCA identified subgroups
for each in an attempt to optimize modularity. As modularity
approaches 1.0, the communities produced by the algorithm
become more segregated. We show the modularity values
in Figure 6. Again, we also noticed a difference in the
organizational structure based on the gang’s race (aligning
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
G
1
7
5
G
25
8
G
32
2
G
33
6
G
42
2
G
4
6
5
G
62
6
G
67
2
G
98
6
G
03
4
G
1
9
7
G
23
7
G
38
3
G
65
1
G
80
9
G
8
1
4
G
81
5
G
84
6
Lo
u
va
in
 M
o
d
u
la
ri
ty
Street Gang
GROUP A GROUP B
Figure 6. The modularity of the partition found with the Louvain algorithm
for each gang.
with anecdotal police observations). Gangs associated with
Racial Group A (more centralized) had lower modularity
scores (by an average of 11.2%) than gangs associated
with Racial Group B (decentralized). This also corresponds
with police observations that gangs affiliated with Racial
Group B tend to operate in smaller factions (where the gang
organizations server more as a confederation) as opposed
to gangs affiliated with Group A (which are typically more
hierarchical).
The creation of a gang’s ecosystem (as described earlier)
is derived directly from the result of the Louvain parti-
tion. Sub-groups identified with the partition are connected
together based on social links between members or by
members who claim to be in more than one gang. Such an
ecosystem is shown in Figure 7. ORCA also provides an an-
alytical report of an ecosystem listing all sub-group relations
and the strength of the relations (based on number of social
ties between organizations) (see Figure 8). Additionally,
ORCA also could identify individuals that connected various
organizations. Example output of this feature is shown in
Figure 9.
D. User Interface
Another priority in developing ORCA was to make the
software accessible to a variety of police personnel. We
created a user interface using the TKinter library version 8.53
and provided network visualizations using Matplotlib 1.2.04.
As displayed in Figure 10, the users can utilize the interface
to easily run new analysis using arrest and relationship data
taken from the result of a database query. They can also
view the reports generated by completed analyisis. When the
analysis is complete, the law enforcement personnel have the
ability to view a full report that is automatically generated in
a portable document format (PDF) using version 1.7 of the
PyFPDF library5. This is useful because it is a widely used
format that is familiar to most users. In addition to the full
report, the users can also view specific reports or network
3http://wiki.python.org/moin/TkInter
4http://matplotlib.org/
5https://code.google.com/p/pyfpdf/
Figure 7. An example ecosystem for one of the gangs analyzed by ORCA.
Figure 8. An example ecosystem analysis for one of the gangs analyzed
by ORCA.
Figure 9. An example report of connectors within one of the gangs
analyzed by ORCA.
visualizations which allows them to easily view the results
of the analysis that has been conducted. Finally, we would
like to note that this is a draft interface that we will refine
throughout the summer of 2013 by conducting studies in the
field as law enforcement personnel utilize the software. We
plan to incorporate the feedback that we gather into further
Figure 10. The ORCA user interface with network visualization and PDF
report output.
versions of the software so that it becomes a more useful
and usable tool.
IV. RELATED WORK
There have been several other pieces of software intro-
duced for both general purpose network analysis as well as
for law enforcement. The main contribution of the software
presented in this paper if the ORCA software. ORCA is that
it is tailor made for specific police requirements dealing with
violent street gangs. Further, it leverage new articiial intel-
lignece and data mining techniques such as MANCALog
and TIP DECOMP. Although ORCA is the first attempt to
combine these techniques in a piece of intelligence analysis
software, there have been other efforts to build software
designed for social network-based intelligence analysis that
we describe below.
Previous software designed to support law-enforcement
through social network analysis include CrimeFighter [14]
and CrimeLink [15]. However, these tools provide comple-
mentary capabilities to ORCA. While ORCA is primarily
designed for intelligence analysis with respect to street
gangs, CrimeLink is designed to support investigations while
CrimeFighter is directed more toward targeting of individ-
uals in criminal organizations - rather than understanding
membership in and linkages between sub-groups. Further,
neither of these software packages support degree of mem-
bership, seed set identification, or the creation of ecosystems.
General-purpose social network analysis software also
exist, including the Organization Risk Analyzer (ORA) [16],
and NodeXL (an add-on to Microsoft Excel) [17]. While
these tools are very powerful and contain many features,
they do not provide the degree of membership calculation or
the identification of seed sets as ORCA does. ORCA is also
purposely designed for police intelligence analysts to better
understand street gangs, and features such as community
finding in ORCA are designed for with this application in
mind (hence the creation of ecosystems and identification
of inter-group connectors). This nuanced use of community
detection for street gang intelligence analysis is not ready
for use “out of the box” in a general-purpose social network
analysis package such as ORA or NodeXL.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced ORCA - the Organizational,
Relationship, and Contact Analyzer - a tool designed from
the ground-up to support intelligence analysis to aide law
enforcement personnel in combating violent street gangs.
We have shown how ORCA can meet various police analysis
needs to include determining degree for gang members of
unknown affiliation, identifying sets of influential individuals
in a gang, and finding and analyzing the sub-organizations
of a gang to determine inter/intra-group relationships.
Our next step with regard to this work is to integrate
geospatial and temporal elements in the analysis - partic-
ularly with respect to community finding and degree of
membership. Currently we are working closely with a major
metropolitan police department to transition ORCA for use
in law enforcement. Throughout the summer of 2013, we are
sending project assistants to work closely with the police in
order to identify additional police requirements that can be
addressed with techniques similar to those discussed in this
paper. Currently the police are employing this analysis for
one district. There are plans to expand to other districts in
late 2013.
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